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Abstract 
The Common Agricultural Policy has radically been reformed in 2003 with the 
introduction of “decoupled” direct payments. Economic theory suggests that direct 
payments are expected to have no impact on production in a static deterministic 
environment with perfect markets for capital and labour. But if factor market 
imperfections or uncertainty are taken into account, this is no longer true. Taking 
into account these potential impacts, the empirical literature has studied the impacts 
of farm payments. However, most studies are based on assumptions such as perfect 
markets, risk neutrality or static environment. Recent researches have also often 
neglected the role of debt constraints. The paper develops and numerically solves a 
dynamic stochastic farm household model with occasionally binding debt constraints 
and investment adjustment costs.  The impacts of direct and counter-cyclical 
payments are explored and compared to an increase in the intervention price. 
Results show that both types of payments will positively impact on investment, but 
the impacts on output will not be as significant as it is with an increase in 
intervention price. Further, the degree of decoupling of Single Farm Payments in the 
French crops sector is found to be significantly linked to the degree of capital market 
imperfections. 
 
Keywords: Single Farm Payment; farm investment; dynamic stochastic farm household model; 
debt constraints. 





Many developed countries have reformed their farm support policies over the last years. This 
process has generally marked a move away from intervention pricing and coupled payments 
towards direct payments. In the European Union, the Mid-Term Review agreed in Luxemburg on 
June 26
th 2003 introduced the Single Farm Payment (SFP).  
Despite the fact that this payment is connected to historical subsidy allocations, the SFP is 
considered to be decoupled from production because it is not linked to current levels of 
production. This feature is crucial since such a payment is classified in the World Trade 
Organization’s Green Box
1. Single Farm Payments and in general direct payments pose some 
conceptual challenges. In fact, the apparent decoupled feature of such payments relies on a 
definition of decoupling that implicitly assumes a static world with no uncertainty and no market 
imperfections. Yet, economic theory has shown that direct payments may have output effects 
through labour market constraints (Benjamin, 1992), binding debt constraints (Phimister, 1995) 
and risk-related effects (Hennessy, 1998) among other possible channels (see Bhaskhar and 
Beghin, 2009; Vercammen, 2007).  
Taking into account these potential sources for direct payments to affect farm output, research 
has been undertaken on the issue of decoupling and on the empirical measure of farm payments. 
However, most studies have assumed either risk neutrality (Baudry, Carpentier and Guyomard, 
1996) or a static environment (Lansink, 1999; Moro and Sckokai, 1999). Doing so, the literature 
has not taken into account the different sources of effects of direct payments and therefore has 
potentially provided biased estimations of the effects of farm payments. Furthermore, another 
problem in the literature is the lack of empirical research on the link between investment and 
direct payments. This is especially relevant as the impact on farm investment may be critical as 
investment decisions affect current and future levels of production. Recently, Sckokai and Moro 
(2009) and Serra et al (2009) show that direct payments may impact on investment and 
production based on dynamic methodologies. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Mishra and 
Goodwin (2004), the role of binding debt constraints has often been neglected in stylized models 
of expected utility maximization by risk-averse agents.  The aim of the paper is to provide an 
empirical measure of the impacts of Single Farm Payments on investment and output decisions 
for French crops farmers, using a framework that uses more potential channels than previous 
studies, by modelling dynamic agricultural production under uncertainty and risk aversion, and 
by taking explicitly into account the role of binding debt constraints. 
While Sckokai and Moro (2009) estimate a structural dynamic model and Serra et al (2009) 
use a reduced form model, we apply another approach to estimate the impacts of farm support 
policies in a dynamic context. Here, we develop and numerically solve a dynamic stochastic 
farm household model with occasionally binding debt constraints and investment adjustment 
costs. The existence of significant credit constraints in French farms (Blancard et al, 2006) 
                                                 
1 Therefore the SFP is not subject to a WTO binding. 
2 
 requires a model that allows studying simultaneously consumption and production choices 
(Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995). Our model based on the framework developed by Phimister 
(1995) is extended for the infinite-horizon case under uncertainty. Because the model does not 
have a closed form solution, a numerical approximation technique is required to solve the 
dynamic stochastic optimization problem linked to our modelling framework. Value function 
iteration is safe, reliable and compatible with the specificities of the model.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. From a methodological perspective, we present a 
new approach to estimate the impacts of direct payments in a dynamic modelling framework in 
which uncertainty and risk aversion are explicitly considered. From an empirical perspective, we 
provide an assessment of the impacts of SFP on investment and output for a representative 
French arable crops farm household, and the first assessment of how the degree of decoupling of 
SFP depends on the farm household’s access to credit.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the modelling framework. Section 3 
describes the data and reviews the calibration. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 




The two period life cycle model developed by Phimister (1995) is extended to an infinite-horizon 
and stochastic framework. The stochastic dynamic model focuses on the decisions of a 
representative farm household. Prices for all inputs are normalised to one. Consider the 
stochastic farm household
2 with preferences described by the following utility function:   
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Where βc < 0, βl > 0. ct denotes consumption and  denotes labour supply. The discount factor 
ensures stationarity in the modelling framework. 
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Where   denotes the interest rate,  the change in farm debt.  t r t cf
 
                                                 
2 Members of the farm household are all identical. 
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 Several types of capital market imperfections are included in the model. Blancard et al (2006) 
find empirical evidence of short-run and long-run credit constraints for a sample of French 
farms. Main capital market imperfections are introduced through the existence of debt 
constraints. The farm household faces restrictions on debt.  
 
      
*
t dd ≤        (1.5)  
Where  , is exogenously determined. The lower bound captures the quantity restrictions which 
farm households face in the capital market. The farm household also faces a no-Ponzi constraint 





















This constraint prevents the farm household to be able to consume without limit and ensures 
that the farm household does not hold any debt at the end of his life. Output,  , is produced by 
means of a production function that takes capital, labour and land as inputs. We explicitly model 
a three-factor production function: 
t y
 
  (,,) , tt t yF k l a t =  (1.7) 
 
Where kt denotes capital and at is land. Next, we assume that the farm household only works on-
farm so that total labour supply corresponds to total on-farm labour supply. The stock of capital 
evolves according to: 
 
  1 (1 ) , tt ki k t δ + = + −  (1.8) 
Where  (0,1) δ ∈ denotes the rate of depreciation of capital, i t  denotes gross investment in 
machinery and buildings. The farm household faces the following budget constraint:  
 
1 .( tt t t t t t t py f p c i k k c f + += + + Φ− + )    (1.9) 
 
Where y t denotes production,   is an exogenous stochastic shock, and  t p t fp denotes a farm 
payment. The left hand side (LHS) corresponds to the total income of the farm household, which 
is equal to the sum of farm income and a possible farm payment. Farm income is the product of 
the level of the production and the price of farm output. Uncertainty is introduced into the farm 
income. Indeed, the first term of the LHS contains a stochastic shock whose dynamics are 
defined further.  
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 Another capital market imperfection is introduced into the cash income constraint. Investment 
adjustment costs prevent farm capital being treated as if it was equivalent to a financial asset, 
therefore implying more realistic production behaviour. The function Ф (.) is meant to capture 
these investment adjustment costs and is assumed to satisfy Ф(0) = Ф’(0) = 0. The restrictions 
imposed on Ф ensure that in the non-stochastic steady-state adjustment costs are zero.  
The model is specified using the following functional forms for preferences and technology. 
The instantaneous utility function is a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function with γ 
as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Previous researches have assumed the same risk 
aversion function (Phimister, 1993; Sckokai and Moro, 2006). This instantaneous utility function 
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Where ω is the intertemporal elasticity in labour supply. The discount factor is given by: 
 
1 (,) [ 1 ] cl c l
ωψ βω
−− =+−  
Where ψ is the elasticity of the discount factor to the utility. This structure of preferences is 
known as Stationary Cardinal Utility (Epstein, 1983) and exhibits a time-varying discount factor. 
While the fixed discount representation of preferences cannot produce stationary stochastic 
equilibrium dynamics, these preferences ensure the stationarity of the dynamics and determine a 
well-defined stationary distribution of debt levels in the model. In addition, these functional 
forms neutralize the wealth effect on labour supply by making the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and labour supply depend on the latter only. This fact is exploited in the 
numerical simulations.  
 
The farm household produces a good using the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
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Despite highly restricted assumptions, the Cobb-Douglas production function provides an 
effective horse work for this study. Other studies have recourse to such production functions 
(Adelman and Taylor, 2003). Arguably less restrictive functional forms have not substantially 
improved previous results (Mundlak, 2000). Constant returns to scale are assumed. This 
assumption can be considered as strong given that the literature has rarely, if never, displayed 
such results. However, Mary (2009) argues that previous results in the literature are due to an 




 Investment adjustment costs, defined as a function of net investment, Kt+1-Kt, where φ>0, are 
as follows:   




φ Φ= >  
The interest rate is exogenous: 
  1 , tt rr r + = =  (1.10) 
  
Similarly to Sckokai and Moro (2009), land is considered to be fixed in the modelling 
framework. In France the average size of land sale transactions has been fairly stable over the 
last 15 years at around 3.3 ha. The relative stability in the observed pattern of the average size of 
farmland sale transactions is likely to be the consequence of rigid sales market regulations in 
France (Swinnen et al, 2008).  The importance of land renting is thus higher in such country with 
strong market regulations
3. Furthermore, the length of rental contracts is of a minimum of 9 
years, which is the highest minimum length of rental contracts in the EU. The renewal 
(inheritance) of rental contracts is also regulated by the government. Overall, formal rental 
markets are much stickier in France. Therefore, we consider land, including both owned land and 
rented land, as a fixed input.  Land is normalized to 1: 
 
  1. t aa = =  (1.11) 
 
Farm income is assumed to be uncertain due to the existence of a stochastic process in the 
equation (1.9). In the literature, two sources of uncertainties have mainly been taken into 
account, i.e. price and output. Here, we assume that the stochastic shock models price 
uncertainty and is governed by a Markov chain
4. Price shocks are assumed to evolve according 
to equation (1.12): 
 
  11 tt pp
ρ
t ε + + =      (1.12) 
Where  t ε is an i.i.d. random variable with unit mean and standard deviation ε σ . This assumption 
is relatively similar to the one in Lansink (1999). Other studies have used the adaptative 
expectation hypothesis (Chavas and Holt, 1990; Pope and Just, 1991; Skockai and Moro, 2006).   
 
                                                 
3 Indeed, French farms rented 75% of the used agricultural area in 2006. 
4 Tauchen (1986) provides an algorithm to approximate a continued valued  (1) AR process using a Markov chain. 
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No closed-form solution to this problem can be found. Nevertheless, the optimal solution can 
be characterized using dynamic programming. Under several assumptions
5, optimal decision 
rules that characterize the equilibrium stochastic process of the household can be obtained by 
solving the functional-equation problem: 
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2.2 Solution technique 
 
Due to non-linearities involved in the equations and its stochastic nature, the maximization 
problem (1.13) cannot be solved analytically. However, even if the exact solution is 
unobtainable, a numerical approximation of the solution can be found. We consider various 
numerical techniques and check whether their characteristics are compatible with both our model 
                                                 
5 The rate of time preference is assumed to be greater then zero. The utility function and the production function are 
assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly concave and bounded above (Phimister, 1993).  
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 and the aim of this paper, which is to simulate alternative policy scenarios (especially 
implementing counter-cyclical payments) in a stochastic environment. 
First, linear methods imply the certainty equivalence property
6. This property restricts the 
range of questions that can be addressed such as alternative policy evaluations (Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe, 2003), especially in a stochastic environment. In particular, linearization solution 
methods that do not incorporate the effect of higher order moments (and then the effect of risk) 
may lead to spurious results and incorrect policy interpretations (Kim and Kim, 2002; Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001). Since the validity of some methods is local, they perform 
poorly away from the steady state. For instance, perturbation methods are very good for states 
near the deterministic steady state. Yet their accuracy declines when we consider values for the 
endogenous variables quite distant from the deterministic state or when the volatility of the 
shocks is relatively large. Further, our model especially features occasional binding constraints. 
Solution methods that produce linear decision rules by using linear quadratic approximations or 
linearizing the first-order conditions in levels or logs cannot handle occasional binding 
constraints. On the contrary, projection methods as well as value function iteration methods can 
accommodate for occasional binding constraints. However, projection methods are particularly 
vulnerable to a change of behaviour in the policy function if the constraint becomes binding 
(Christiano and Fisher, 2001; Heer and Maussner, 2008). Considering all the elements above, the 
model is solved via value function iteration method. This solution technique is safe, reliable and 
rather easy to implement. 
 




The data are drawn from the French Farm Business Surveys (FADN) for the years 1996-2003 
from the data which all national agencies in the EU are obliged to provide the European 
Commission (EU Commission, 1989). The data are farm level data with the samples of farms 
chosen so as to be representative of French agriculture, with detailed data provided on farm 
output, on farm labour supply, farm investment, assets and debts etc. However, neither 
consumption data nor off-farm labour information are available in the dataset.  In general, each 
survey farm remains in the survey for 5 or 6 years.  Hence, a panel of farms can be constructed 
for the period. Only farms which specialise in crop production are studied. The sample is defined 
according to a set of following criteria. We start with an original sample of 2176 farms observed 
for 8 years, between 1996 and 2003, for a total number of 8685 observations. The sample 
consists of all the farms that have been surveyed for at least 4 years. Then all observations where 
the log difference of the capital stock variable between two consecutive years exceeds 3 in 
absolute value are dropped. Finally, any observation considered as outliers has been removed. 
                                                 
6 The certainty equivalence property implies that the optimal solution to the problem with uncertainty is equivalent 
to the solution of the certainty problem. 
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 There are 1479 crops farms, observed for 8 years, between 1996 and 2003, satisfying these 
conditions for a total number of 7508 observations.  
3.2 Calibration  
 
The model includes a series of parameters that have to be set before any solution technique can 
be applied to approximate the solution to the problem (1.13). The dynamic model is 
parameterized to farm level data using a sample of French arable crops farms. Table 1 reports the 
parameterization.  
 
  Table 1 
Calibration of dynamic stochastic farm household model 
K α   N α  
L α   γ   δ r ψ  φ  ρ  σε w a  
0.15 0.62  0.23 0.097  0.2  0.05 0.08 0.5  0.68 0.028  3  1 
 
Farm output elasticities are extracted from Mary (2009) in which a three-factor production 
function has been estimated for the French crops sector using a hybrid system GMM estimation 
accounting for variations in utilization rates. Other parameters are calibrated using estimates 
from the empirical literature and actual data. The risk aversion factor γ is taken from Sckokai 
and Moro (2009). As pointed out by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), estimates of the capital 
adjustment cost parameter φ range over 20 to as low as 3
7. Nevertheless, estimates of φ are 
subject to a measurement error (upward bias) due to the misspecification of q-theory based 
models (Cooper and Ejarque, 2001). The adjustment cost is set to a relatively low value. The 
interest rate and the depreciation rate are both estimated using the FADN panel data. The value 
of w (1 plus the inverse of the elasticity in labour supply) is believed to be relevant with a recent 
literature regarding the econometric estimation of labour supply elasticities (Domeij and Floden, 
2001; Felices and Tinley, 2004). Given the other parameters values, θ is determined by the 
steady-state condition that equates the rate of time preference with the interest rate. This is done 
by imposing the restriction that the average change in debt ψ is about 8 percent, as observed in 
the FADN dataset. Price uncertainty is modelled by an  (1) AR process. We follow the 
methodology used in Lansink (1999) and Chavas and Holt (1990) to calibrate the stochastic 
process modelling price uncertainty.  
 




                                                 
7 Different methods and datasets explain these various results. Some studies have captured the adjustment costs with 
only convex costs while some recent works have also taken into account non-convex costs.   
9 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparative analysis of several farm payments in terms 
of farm investment and output. First, the baseline scenario is the one in which no farm support 





Scenarios Farm  support 
1.  Baseline   No farm support policy 
2.  Intervention pricing (IP)  Increase in price intervention 
3.  Direct payment (DP)  Equal-sized direct payment 
4.  Counter-cyclical payment (CCP)  Equal-sized CCP 
 
The first alternative scenario models an increase in the intervention price of about 10 per cent, 
which corresponds to an increase in expected prices of about 1.55 per cent.  The existence of 
intervention prices results in a truncation of the price distribution. In practice, the existence of 
intervention prices is modelled through the distribution of shocks. This scenario is designed to 
represent the traditional CAP before major reforms were undertaken in 1990s. The second 
alternative scenario models the provision of the same monetary amount in the form of direct 
payments. This scenario is designed with a direct reference to the Single Farm Payment of the 
European Union. The fixed direct payment is calculated as the average difference between the 
long-term income of the baseline scenario and the income impact of the intervention price 
scenario. These direct payments do not depend on the current level of production and are time 
invariant throughout the simulations. The third scenario models a counter-cyclical payment 
(CCP) or more precisely, the counter-cyclical provision of equal-sized fixed farm payments. The 
farm household receives a fixed payment, every period in which the market price falls below a 
certain level. This scenario represents current CCPs (or previous deficiency payments) in the 
United States. However, the countercyclical programme of payments in the USA is somewhat 
different from our simulations. In practice, when market prices fall below a target price, US 
farmers receive a payment which depends on current market prices and therefore is variable. 
Although CCPs do not depend on current levels of production and force farmers to look to 
market prices, not to farm payments, CCPs are believed to have significant impacts on output 
decisions (Vercammen, 2007). In this scenario, the farm payment acts an insurance scheme. 
When the market price is above the target level, no payment is made. Therefore, in absolute 
terms, this last scenario involves a lesser amount of farm payments than the previous two 
alternative scenarios
8.  
                                                 
8 The total amount of payments in the scenario implementing the counter-cyclical provision of payments is 
equivalent to 58% of the total amount of payments in the scenario with direct payments. 
10 
 For each run, the model is simulated by introducing a set of price shocks. Results are averages 
over 1,000 simulations, where each simulation consists of 30 periods. Farm payments are time 
invariant. 
 
4.2 Baseline results  
 
4.2.1 Unconstrained farm household  
 
Table 3 presents the long-run impacts of the simulated policy changes on farm investment and 
output when the farm household does not face any debt constraints (i.e. unconstrained regime)
9. 
The results show that the increase in the intervention price would positively and strongly affect 
farm investment (+3.36 per cent) and output in the unconstrained regime (+2.43 per cent).  If the 
same monetary amount was provided in the forms of direct payments, it would not significantly 
impact on investment and therefore on output (0.01 per cent). Direct payments have no impact as 
if they were truly decoupled for the representative farm household. The alternative scenario 
regarding the counter-cyclical provision of fixed payments would also have no effect on 
investment and farm output. These findings, i.e. the absence of impacts, are possibly the 
consequence of a very low level of risk aversion. Indeed, Hennessy (1998) shows that farm 
payments may affect output decisions through wealth and insurance effects. However, these 
effects arise if and only if the farmer is risk averse. We thus hypothesize that the absence of 
effects is due to the very low risk aversion factor. 
 
4.2.2 Debt-constrained farm household  
 
Economic literature has suggested the relevance of debt constraints as an explaining factor of the 
potentially coupled nature of direct payments. Access to credit is indeed crucial to finance the 
demand for capital goods. When this access to credit is limited, the level of farm investment may 
be affected if the debt constraint is binding or anticipated to be binding. The existence of debt 
constraints is modelled by assuming that:     
t d0 . ≤  
This constraint is relatively strong in the sense that any investment will have to be financed 
out of internal resources, while in the unconstrained regime the farm household could finance 
investment through internal resources and debt. According to the economic literature, direct 
payments may potentially affect investment decisions when the farm household is debt-
constrained.   
In the constrained regime the increase in the intervention price would have very similar 
effects on investment than in the unconstrained case. For example, the impact on output would 
be 2.43 per cent against 2.34 per cent in the constrained regime. Yet, it seems that the impacts of 
                                                 
9 In practice, the debt constraint has been calibrated to a extremely low level so that it is as if there were no debt 
constraint or it would never bind.  
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 intervention pricing would be less in the constrained regime. This is especially noteworthy when 
comparing the impacts on farm investment (3.36 per cent in the unconstrained regime against 
2.73 per cent in the constrained regime). Our result is somewhat compatible with the analytical 
result found in Phimister (1995) that the effect of a change in the output price on capital stock in 
the debt constrained regime is always strictly less than the effect in the unconstrained regime.  
 
Table 3 
Long-run impacts of farm support policies 
   Baseline Intervention  price Direct  payment Counter-cyclical  payment 
0.097 γ =  
Unconstrained regime 
Investment 0.088  0.091  0.088  0.088 
 per cent Change    3.368 0.084  0.021 
Output 0.763  0.781  0.763  0.763 
 per cent Change    2.436 0.011  0.012 
Constrained regime 
Investment 0.083  0.085  0.083  0.084 
 per cent Change    2.736 0.287  1.028 
Output 0.755  0.773  0.756  0.756 
 per cent Change    2.344 0.023  0.136 
  
Direct payments would seem to impact a little on investment (0.28 per cent).  However, this 
very small increase in farm investment would not translate into a significantly higher level of 
output (+0.02 per cent). Furthermore, results show that CCPs would affect farm investment in 
the constrained regime while they would not in the unconstrained regime. In the unconstrained 
regime, CCPs would increase farm investment by 1.02 per cent. Nonetheless, this increase in 
investment would not affect farm output as much (0.13 per cent).  
Overall, direct and counter-cyclical payments would impact farm investment in the 
constrained regime. However, these small impacts on investment would not lead to a 
significantly higher level of production. These results may be linked to the calibration of the 
dynamic model. In particular, the coefficient of risk aversion is very low. Last, but not least, 
these findings suggest that the existence of debt constraints would affect the extent to which farm 
policies impact on investment and output decisions in the French crops sector.  
 
4.3 Farm payments and risk aversion 
 
The risk aversion parameter used in the calibration is in the lower range of values found in the 
literature. In this section, we proceed to the same analysis as presented in the precedent section 
12 
 across higher levels of risk aversion. Tables 4 and 5 present the long-term impacts of the 




Long-run impacts of farm payments and higher risk aversion: unconstrained regime 
   Baseline Price  intervention Direct  payment Counter-cyclical  payment 
0.5 γ =  
Investment 0.088  0.092  0.088  0.088 
 per cent Change    4.196 0.132  0.125 
Output 0.763  0.783  0.763  0.763 
 per cent Change    2.602 0.019  0.027 
0.75 γ =  
Investment 0.087  0.092  0.087  0.088 
 per cent Change    6.192 0.118  0.300 
Output 0.761  0.783  0.762  0.762 
 per cent Change    2.889 0.015  0.047 
 
4.3.1 Unconstrained farm household  
 
First, the scenario modelling the increase in intervention price would significantly affect 
investment and so farm output in the unconstrained regime. This result is found for all degrees of 
risk aversion. For instance, when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 0.5, the price 
intervention scenario would increase farm investment by 4.19 per cent and farm output by 2.60 
per cent.   
More importantly, the magnitude of these positive effects seems to be affected by the level of 
risk aversion: the impacts on investment and output become greater with a higher coefficient of 
relative risk aversion.  For respective values of γ  equal to 0.097, 0.5 and 0.75, a 10 per cent 
increase in the intervention price would then increase farm investment by 3.36 per cent, 4.19 per 
cent and 6.19 per cent.  These higher levels of investment would lead to respective increases in 
farm output of 2.34 per cent, 2.60 per cent and 2.88 per cent. 
On the contrary, support-equivalent direct payments would have no significant effect on 
output in the unconstrained regime. This result holds for higher levels of risk aversion. This 
result can be explained by the fact that direct payments would have no effect or very minimal 
effects on investment. With respect to the scenario simulating the counter-cyclical provision of 
fixed farm payments, farm output would not be significantly affected.  
Overall, when the farm household is in the unconstrained regime, we find that the increase in 
the intervention price would increase output while direct and counter-cyclical payments would 
have no impact on farm output. We present below the same analysis in the constrained situation. 
13 




4.3.2 Debt-constrained farm household 
 
Results show that in the constrained regime the intervention pricing scenario would lead to very 
similar effects on investment than in the unconstrained case. Because the investment effects 
would be pretty similar as in the unconstrained regime, the output impacts would be alike too. 
For instance, when 0.75 γ = , the output impact of the first alternative scenario would be 2.88 per 
cent in the unconstrained regime against 2.23 per cent in the constrained regime.  
 
Table 5 
Long-run impacts of farm payments and higher risk aversion: constrained regime 
   Baseline Price  intervention Direct  payment Counter-cyclical  payment 
0.5 γ =  
Investment 0.082  0.084  0.083  0.083 
 per cent Change    2.040 0.580  1.216 
Output 0.755  0.722  0.756  0.756 
 per cent Change    2.253 0.134  0.231 
0.75 γ =  
Investment 0.083  0.084  0.083  0.084 
 per cent Change    1.975 0.749  1.229 
Output 0.755  0.772  0.756  0.757 
 per cent Change    2.236 0.152  0.244 
 
Furthermore, we confirm the previous finding that the intervention pricing support instrument 
would have lesser impacts on farm investment and output in the constrained regime than in the 
unconstrained regime. With higher values of risk aversion, direct payments would significantly 
impact on farm investment. In the constrained regime, the investment effect of the scenario with 
direct payments would be +0.58 per cent and +0.74 per cent for respective values of risk 
aversion of 0.5 and 0.75. Despite these investment impacts, the impacts of direct payments on 
farm output would remain very small. Finally, CCPs would have much larger positive effects on 
investment than in the unconstrained regime. For example, for a risk aversion parameter of 0.5, 
the investment impact would be +1.21 per cent, leading up to an output effect of +0.23 per cent. 
CCPs would seem to have larger impacts than direct payments in the constrained regime. These 
findings may suggest the relative greater amplitude of insurance and wealth effects when the risk 
aversion is higher. 
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 4.4 Production ratios and degree of decoupling 
 
To compare the degree of decoupling of both direct payments and CCPs, we calculate the 
average production ratios as defined in OECD (2001). The effects on production of the direct 
payment and the CCP scenarios are compared with the effects of an increase in the intervention 
price. The production ratios compare the production change due to the intervention pricing with 
those generated by direct payments and CCPs. Ratios very close to zero imply effective full 
decoupling whereas a ratio of 1 indicates a fully coupled policy. 
 
Table 6 
Average production ratios for the representative farm household 
   Unconstrained regime  Constrained regime 
   DP /IP
2 1 CCP /IP 
3 DP/IP CCP/IP 
0.097 γ =   0.004 0.005 0.009 0.057 
0.5 γ =   0.000 0.010 0.059 0.102 
0.75 γ =   0.005 0.016 0.068 0.109 
1
IP: 10 per cent increase in intervention price (1.55 per cent increase in expected price) 
2
DP: support-equivalent in the Single Farm Payment 
3
CCP: support-equivalent in the Counter-cyclical Payment 
 
Table 6 confirms that direct payments are decoupled in the unconstrained regime. The signs 
of the output changes are positive but practically equal to zero for all risk aversion parameters. 
The production ratios for the scenario with CCPs are similar to those with direct payments, 
except for 0.75 γ = to some extent. The production ratios in the constrained regime indicate that 
direct payments are not decoupled anymore, except for the lowest risk aversion coefficient that is 
almost a situation of risk neutrality. However, the degree of coupling generally remains very 
small. It is also noteworthy that the degree of coupling of direct payments increases with the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, suggesting the relative greater amplitude of insurance and 
wealth effects.  Further, the degree of coupling for counter-cyclical payments also increases with 
respect to the unconstrained regime. For 0.097 γ = , the computed production ratio is 0.057 in the 
constrained regime (against 0.005 in the unconstrained regime). When increasing the factor of 
relative risk aversion, the production ratios of CCPs increase as well. For 0.75 γ = , the 
production ratio is 0.109. Results thus confirm the partially coupled nature of these payments.  
In our simulations, the direct payment is modelled so as to represent the Single Farm 
Payment. The main conclusion from Table 6 is that the Single Farm Payment is not totally 
decoupled when the farm household faces significant debt restrictions. However, given the very 
low production ratios obtained across risk aversion parameters and financial regimes, the 
assumption of an effective decoupling of the SFP is reasonable in the French arable crops sector.  
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 Finally, we can also compare the direct payment to the counter-cyclical payment. For all 
levels of relative risk aversion, the production ratio of CCPs is larger than of direct payments. In 
particular, the relative larger magnitude of CCPs in terms of output impacts is striking in the 
debt-constrained regime. This is quite an important result as the counter-cyclical scenario, which 
was designed to represent previous deficiency payments and current CCPs in the United States, 
implies a much lesser amount of subsidies to the farm household, making of CCPs a much more 





This paper assesses the impacts of farm policies on investment and output of a sample of French 
arable crops farms observed from 1996 and 2003. Our empirical analysis is based on the 
framework developed by Phimister (1995), which is extended to an infinite horizon and 
stochastic framework. The model presented here contributes to the existing literature by applying 
a different approach to those of Sckokai and Moro (2009) and Serra et al (2009) to represent 
dynamic agricultural production under uncertainty and risk aversion.  
A dynamic stochastic farm household model with occasionally binding debt constraints and 
investment adjustment costs is developed, calibrated to farm level data and numerically solved to 
explore the impacts of an increase in the intervention price as well as the effects of Single Farm 
Payments and Counter-cyclical Payments in French crops farms. 
Results show that an increase in the intervention price would significantly impact farm 
investment and output decisions in the unconstrained and debt-constrained regimes. On the 
contrary, SFPs would only affect investment decisions in the debt-constrained regime. More 
importantly, these impacts on farm investment would increase with the degree of risk aversion. 
In all cases, they would remain too little so that output decisions would not be significantly 
affected. Finally, CCPs would have no or minimal effects on investment and output if the farm 
household was not debt-constrained. But, if the farm household was debt-constrained, CCPs 
would affect farm investment and to a lesser extent output decisions much more than SFPs.  
Although SFPs are found to potentially affect investment and output decisions, given the 
relatively low degree of coupling of Single Farm Payments, it is reasonable to consider that the 
Single Farm Payment is “empirically” decoupled in this French FADN sample of arable crops 
farms. This result is consistent with Sckokai and Moro (2009), whose findings confirm the 
relatively decoupled nature of the Single Farm Payment using an Italian FADN sample of arable 
crops farmers. Further, our findings highlight that the degree of decoupling of farm payments is 
strongly linked to the existence of significant debt constraints and to the degree of risk aversion 
and confirm that these two factors are key variables to incorporate when assessing the impacts on 
farm support policies.  
A number of caveats to the work need to be emphasized. The main limitation of this study is 
that our results rely on the choice of parameters. Specifically, our results are subject to the Lucas 
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 critique to the similar extent that Sckokai and Moro (2009) and Serra et al (2009) are. The 
parameterization represents the behaviour of French crops farms between 1996 and 2003, i.e. to 
data referring to the pre-reform period. Therefore, our results are based on the assumption that 
changes in farm support policies would not alter the farm household decisions. In addition, a few 
parameters have, to some extent, been arbitrarily chosen. For example, more research is needed 
in the econometric estimation of adjustments costs and risk aversion parameters. For these 
reasons, our findings should be treated with caution. Another caveat relates to the modelling 
framework. The current version of the model ignores off-farm work. Further extensions of the 
model could take into account the possibility that part of the household’s time is allocated to off-
farm work. This may modify the simulation results since off-farm activities may be rather 
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